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The new readiness

Anyone who thinks Robert Gates won’t make big changes during his second stint as defense secretary hasn’t been paying attention.

His essay in January’s Foreign Affairs called for a strategy of balance, a point Gates recently echoed before Congress: The U.S. military must retain the ability to fight conventional wars but improve its counterinsurgency capabilities — and make tough choices to do that on tightening budgets.

In other words, the “do everything, buy everything” days are over, Gates said.

Since taking office in 2006, Gates has accused the military of spending too much time and money preparing for conventional future wars at the expense of planning for the kinds of counterinsurgency efforts now underway in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But Gates’ critics say the future is too unpredictable, and the high-end capabilities he criticizes are vital to fighting both nation-states and insurgents.

The coming Quadrennial Defense Review will work out the administration’s military vision. But Gates is right — America’s ponderous procurement system produces weapons that are too complex, too expensive and sometimes ill-considered, and they often fall short of what the war fighter really needs. In the end, huge sums are wasted while more pressing and emerging demands are ignored.

The Defense Department’s obsession with seeking perfect solutions — a chronic condition abetted by Congress and industry — wastes years and billions of dollars, while “75-percent” solutions can be fielded in months and at less cost.

Gates is justifiably peeved that the only way to rapidly field critical war needs for armored vehicles, unmanned systems and electronics has been to go outside the formal acquisition system.

Given the breadth of future missions and an inevitable squeeze from the failing economy, military training, organization and equipping must be transformed. That means some programs, some major, will be canceled and others scaled back.

Specifically, the soaring unit-costs of ships, aircraft and other systems must be slashed so that production quantities can rise. For example, at $6 billion apiece, the Navy can’t build enough destroyers to meet global missions.

Only what’s truly needed should be bought, without unnecessary features that push up costs along with requirements. It also means abandoning a culture so risk-averse that it can’t make important decisions.

Such changes will face military, industry and congressional opposition. One antidote will be investment in more rigorous analytic capabilities to make and defend tough decisions. Those who adapt to the new environment will thrive; those who try to have it all will fail.

Betting against Gates is a losing proposition. He helped put the Iraq war on a path to success, sacked those in the Army who failed their soldiers, canned Air Force leaders for nuclear gaffes and ended up keeping the top defense job when so many predicted he would retire.

It’s up to Gates and his team to reform the Pentagon, but it’s up to President Barack Obama and bipartisan leaders to instill discipline on Capitol Hill, where lawmakers’ continued meddling drives up program costs.

If the Obama administration is as change-minded today as it was during the campaign, it must seize this opportunity to fundamentally overhaul the acquisition system.

More incremental tweaks are not the answer.