Marine Corps News, news from Iraq - Marine Corps Times

Readiness of ousted spec ops unit questioned

The recent expulsion from Afghanistan of the Marine Corps’ first special operations company did more than just put the relatively new leatherneck command in the spotlight. It has made many question whether the company was up to the task in the first place.

The removal of Marine Special Operations Company-Fox came sometime after a March 4 suicide attack and ambush on the Marines’ convoy in Afghanistan left at least eight Afghans dead and another 34 wounded along a highway, about a month after the company had arrived in the country.

The Marines’ response on that day is under scrutiny by at least one major investigation. The region’s top commander, Army Maj. Gen. Frank Kearney — head of U.S. Special Operations Command-Central Command — ordered the expulsion, citing concerns about the unit’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency in the area, a spokesman for Kearney said March 23.

The Army-led investigation into the incident is continuing, and officials were mum on details of the incident. A Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command spokesman said the company would rejoin the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit — with whom it deployed from the East Coast in January — and take on other spec-ops missions in the region as needed.

But conversations in some Marine circles — both active and retired — and on the Internet since the expulsion have stirred speculation about the company’s reassignment, and the Corps’ future in the world of spec ops.

Some Marine combat veterans say the recall of the 120-man company is a “black eye,” an “embarrassment” and a public humiliation that could do irreparable damage to MarSOC, which officially stood up just over a year ago. The command is the Corps’ contribution to U.S. Special Operations Command, which, until a year ago, had only soldiers, sailors and airmen working for it.

Some worry that the incident smears the good name and service of others serving in MarSOC, which has under 1,500 members and is expected to grow to a 2,600-man force by October 2008. Others question the political motives, both on the ground in Afghanistan and within the spec-ops community, behind the expulsion.

“This is just an IED and an ambush and a reaction — that’s all it was — but it’s got political overtones and military overtones,” said Ken Jordan, a retired colonel and reconnaissance veteran who has long advocated a Marine presence within SOCom.

To some seasoned veterans, though, the expulsion of an entire unit smacked of a personal attack against MarSOC. Worse, SOCCent’s acknowledgement of the company’s removal — the command is known for its lack of regular public admissions — seemed to some a way to stick it to the Marines in a very public way.

“I think it’s the Army’s way of saying ‘You guys are not ready to play in this arena,’ ” said one experienced officer, a Marine reservist who worked closely with Navy SEALs and Army Special Forces during his deployment to Iraq last year.

Jordan said he was surprised to hear news reports about the spec-ops company’s expulsion from Afghanistan. “I’m hoping it’s not [about] an interservice rivalry type of thing,” he said. “The country is better off with the Marine Corps in the field in the global war on terror than if they were on the bench.”

Afghanistan remains busy ground for U.S. special operations forces. Combat operations in Afghanistan are about counterinsurgency —“winning the hearts and minds” to help bolster the fledgling government — and that requires specialized units with more training and finesse to do unconventional warfare.

“They learned a lesson ... and it went right to the headlines,” said Bob Newman, a retired gunnery sergeant and experienced reconnaissance veteran who’s authored several books on tactics and warfare.

“The internal fighting is going to be real ugly,” he added.

Maj. Cliff Gilmore, spokesman for MarSOC, said the command is in the midst of evaluating its training procedures to see whether training needs to be changed as a result of the allegations in Afghanistan.

“MarSOC completed an initial after-action assessment of our training and deployment process and we have not modified our training and deployment schedule at this time,” Gilmore wrote in an e-mail response to submitted questions. “However, once we receive the results of the ongoing investigation and any after-action reports from the theater of operations, we will review the information provided and modify our processes if appropriate.”

Hard early lesson for MarSOC?

The March 4 incident was first reported by The Associated Press, which quoted several Afghan witnesses and wounded civilians who said U.S. forces fired on civilians in cars and on foot after a suicide bomber in a minivan struck a vehicle in a Marine convoy, injuring one.

The Marines responded with gunfire, shooting as they continued to drive along a six-mile stretch of highway, according to the AP. Initial statements by the military stated that the Marines reported they came under fire from insurgents, and some civilians may have been struck down by enemy fire, although that remains part of the investigation.

“I saw them turning and firing from this direction, then turning and firing in that direction,” Ahmed Najab, 23, who was shot in the shoulder, told AP. “I even saw a farmer shot by the Americans.”

“They were firing everywhere,” another Afghan, Tur Gul, 38, who was shot in his right hand, told AP. “They opened fire on everybody, the ones inside the vehicles and the ones on foot.”

The incident prompted a protest in the region.

Suicide attacks aren’t uncommon in Afghanistan and Iraq. Military forces often fight their way out through the “kill zone” or launch a counterattack, depending on rules of engagement and standard operating procedures for the particular locale or situation. The extent of a counterattack’s footprint largely depends on the particular unit and circumstances.

But some wonder whether the Marines in the convoy might have overreacted in that situation.

One commentator on Strategypage, an Internet bulletin board aimed at spec ops, wondered what happened to discipline of fire.

“It takes an extreme amount of discipline not to ride out of an ambush/IED/attack and not shoot the entire population,” wrote “GOP.” “If the original report is true, then the MarSOC Marines effed up very, very badly and honestly looked like a bunch of college school guys, not highly trained professionals.”

One field-grade officer who worked in MarSOC last year referred to the company as “a bunch of Keystone cops.”

“In SOF, you’ve gotta be strong and smart,” he said.

And that, said the Marine officer, means making the right calls and exercising good judgment in the heat of combat. He wondered whether, in the chaos of an ambush, they overreacted to the situation by firing more indiscriminately.

“It didn’t surprise me,” he said of the incident. His concern was that the company had been rushed too quickly so it could deploy on time with the 26th MEU, and hadn’t had sufficient time to build more demanding individual skills and teamwork that spec ops requires. “They haven’t proved themselves,” he said of MarSOC.

“Det 1 proved themselves. They proved themselves credible and useful.”

The officer was referring to Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1, the Marines’ test spec-ops unit, which trained at Camp Pendleton, Calif., and deployed to Iraq in 2004, a combat tour that earned numerous combat awards, including 11 Bronze Stars for valor.

The Det, which received repeated praise from several studies done by SOCom and the Center for Naval Analyses, was deactivated a year ago. The incident in Afghanistan has some Marines wondering: Did the Corps make a mistake in summarily dismissing the unit? What other lessons learned from the Det test should MarSOC adopt? Det 1 had a very senior and seasoned group of staff noncommissioned and officers.

“It was a cohesive, well-trained team,” said the former MarSOC officer. “It was ready to go, and they broke it up.”

The Det’s more senior makeup paralleled other spec-ops forces, the “quiet professionals” that include Army Special Forces units, for a reason. Spec ops “takes a very mature, very seasoned individual. It takes a lot of training and experience to really build them,” said the officer, who noted that most soldiers in Army SF units he’s known in Iraq had spent 10 to 15 years in special operations.

That experience, maturity and team integrity can pay dividends, especially in counterinsurgency, he said. “It’s the kind of missions where you need to be very concerned about bravado. It’s the kind of mission that can turn a ‘no better friend, no worse enemy’ into a ‘no worse friend, no better enemy,’” he added.

That’s not the case with MarSOC — at least not yet. “These guys haven’t been there that long,” he said.

“Older and wiser is what you need,” agreed one Marine who’s pulled several tours in Iraq and is eyeing a shot at spec ops. “MarSOC is still looking at how to pick the right guys so it will be some time before all the ‘baby diseases’ will be worked out.”

One Army Special Forces officer echoed the thoughts of many in his community, who are wary of the Marine newcomers.

“This is an example of why maturity matters in counterinsurgency operations,” he said.

The decision to pull the company out of Afghanistan is being portrayed as one made because of Afghan perceptions of the unit, he noted, but actually, “It was a very punitive action.”

Gilmore, MarSOC’s spokesman, said predeployment training for Marine spec-ops companies is similar to the lengthy and intensive workups for reconnaissance Marines, with two differences: MSOCs work with other special operations forces; and they undergo “mission-specific training focused on geographical attunement including language and culture and the special operations skill sets necessary to conduct assigned missions.”

He rebuffed the notion that training was rushed in order to get the first company into the fleet.

“Many of the Marines assigned to the MSOC in question are former force reconnaissance Marines with extensive combat experience,” Gilmore wrote. “Prior to their deployment, they completed a comprehensive training package and Deployment Certification Exercise to ensure their readiness to conduct SOF missions. The MarSOC commander certified the MSOC as ready for SOF deployment and would not have done so if the company was not well trained, equipped and prepared to deploy.”

Gilmore added that the command, although it has a tight schedule to man up, is making sure its units aren’t jumping the gun to deploy.

“We intend to ensure we do not confuse enthusiasm with capability,” he wrote.

Experience under the gun

Others are also saying that Fox Company was extensively trained and was a full-up round.

Each MSOC “was built specifically with deployment in mind, using combat veterans, and they had intensive training in close-quarters battle skills. It’s far more than a standard infantry unit,” said Bruce F. Meyers, retired colonel and commander of the Corps’ first force reconnaissance company. Many force recon Marines have been fed directly into MarSOC.

“There was no lack of experience with the people involved,” he said.

Meyers, whose wrote a book, “Fortune Favors the Brave,” which details the Corps’ history of force reconnaissance, cautioned against jumping to conclusions before the investigation sorts out the facts.

“I don’t know what the investigation is going to show,” he said. But “there was no indication there was any lack of training in deployment.”

“Some people question, were they sufficiently trained?” he added. “They were superbly trained and superbly equipped. So we’ll have to wait and see what they find in the investigation.”

Jordan, the retired colonel, said he’s confident that Maj. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, MarSOC’s commander, will steer MarSOC through the rough currents. “He’s going to let this investigation go run its course and let it finish,” he said. “This is unfortunately distracting him from his own job.”

Still, the incident put MarSOC in damage-control mode as it reviews and reassesses its procedures and policies, and continues to recruit and screen new members and train additional companies for their upcoming deployments.

At this point, it might take a full-court press by MarSOC to restore faith and convince any doubters about its place within SOCom and on the front lines in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“If everybody is cleared [of wrongdoing], and they say nothing happened that was out of touch with standard practices and procedures, they are still behind the eight ball,” Jordan said.

***

Staff writers Sean D. Naylor and Trista Talton contributed to this report.

Discuss:

Readiness of ousted Spec Ops unit questioned