In August, the Defense Department ordered 30 private and state universities to review their ties with foreign institutions listed under Section 1286 of the fiscal 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, which seeks to restrict nations like China and Russia from gaining access to American research and technology.

Failure to comply could have resulted in a cutoff of federal research funding.

“All 30 universities have fully mitigated identified relationships with foreign entities of concern,” according to a DoD announcement on Monday. “Overall, the audits resulted in more than 80 termination-related actions across the 30 universities.”

The Pentagon did not publicly list the 30 institutions but hailed seven of them on Monday for going “above and beyond” by “quickly terminating problematic relationships.” Those seven included: Oklahoma State University, The Pennsylvania State University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of South Carolina, University of Southern California, University of Texas at Austin and Virginia Tech.

“These academic institutions that went above and beyond deserve immense credit for setting the benchmark in domestic research security,” said Joseph Jewell, assistant secretary of defense for science and technology. ”Rather than settling for minimum compliance, these institutions took bold, self-initiated steps to protect their labs, faculty, and intellectual property from foreign exploitation.”

In addition to auditing their ties with foreign institutions listed in the 2019 NDAA, the Pentagon ordered the universities to review partnerships with “organizations associated with rebranded Confucius Institutes” that teach Chinese language and culture — but which the U.S. government fears actually spread Chinese government propaganda on college campuses.

The August review followed the July release of DoD’s fiscal 2025 update of “foreign institutions engaging in problematic activities.” The list named 130 academic and research institutions located in China, Russia and Iran.

“These institutions have been confirmed to engage in activities that increase the likelihood of U.S. government-funded research and development efforts being misappropriated,” the Pentagon said.

In addition to severing ties with the designated entities, American colleges also conducted “precautionary terminations involving entities not specifically identified on the list,” the Pentagon said Monday.

The U.S. government has been cracking down on both military and civilian research collaboration with China. In August, Ohio State University agreed to a $2.1 million settlement after civil allegations that it failed to disclose employee affiliations with Chinese institutions regarding NASA and National Science Foundation projects.

Other nations are also scrutinizing ties between local universities and Chinese colleges. Last month, the UK ordered British universities to cease working with the China General Technology Research Institute, which British security services believe to be a front for Chinese espionage. Beijing denied the allegations.

The goal is to have benchmarks that will allow assessment of the “physiological and biomechanical effects of blast injuries” caused by explosions of enemy munitions or the blast effects from firing friendly weapons, according to the Request for Information by the Blast Injury Research Coordinating Office, or BIRCO, within U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command.

This will enable “risk assessment of military service members who are exposed to blunt impacts resulting from acceleration of the body, blunt injury from a ballistic strike to the helmet, or effects from blast pressure produced by a weapon system or explosion,” the RFI reads.

BIRCO is seeking a variety of information that can help formulate standards for assessing mild traumatic brain injuries, or mTBI. The information could include existing criteria, standards and models for brain injuries, as well as identifying experts on the topic.

The Pentagon is also seeking input from manufacturers of protective gear that can be “highly relevant to understanding human tolerance limits and predicting blast injuries.”

The RFI uses a broad definition of blast injuries, including the effects on the body of blast-wave overpressure, fragments, the human body being thrown against hard objects, collapsing buildings and burns, as well as the effects of toxic gases and radiation.

“The standards can range from simple dose response curves and injury thresholds that address single components of blast insults, such as blast pressure wave magnitude, or address multiple components of blast insults, such as pressure magnitude over time,” the RFI said.

These standards will be used for “health hazard assessments, survivability assessments, and protection system development aimed at producing safe weapon systems, survivable combat platforms, and effective protection systems.”

The effects of traumatic brain injuries on military personnel have become better known in recent years. There is evidence that exposure to the blast of firing artillery, tank guns and handheld missiles, as well as being thrown around while riding small boats used by special operations forces, leads to brain trauma, or even TBI.

Department of Defense data from the Iran war shows a relatively high proportion of head trauma from Iranian missile and drone strikes.

The RFI was published after the Government Accountability Office released the findings of its investigation into the ability of military services to provide baseline cognitive assessments to troops. Across the services, the Defense Department is hampered by staff shortages and a lack of technology needed to conduct the assessments, the GAO found.

The Pentagon announced in April that it will begin a one-year pilot program to test a new cognitive assessment tool, an app that service members can use to complete assessments. DoD officials said the app will be less resource-intensive than current assessments and will help improve the services’ ability to track exposures.

Veterans who have suffered traumatic brain injuries are more than twice as likely to die by suicide, according to a 2019 study.

In particular, a Congressional Research Service report, released Tuesday, pointed to the war in Ukraine, where armored vehicles have largely been driven from the battlefield by unmanned aerial vehicles and guided munitions.

“As ACVs are intended to provide organic, direct fire support to dismounted Marines in the attack, how vulnerable to these threat systems are ACVs during amphibious operations and when operating ashore to support combat operations?” the research service asked in its report. “Are the Marines considering additional ACV survivability modifications based on lessons learned in Ukraine?”

In fact, the Marine Corps did award a contract last month to Anduril for a counter-UAS system to protect the ACV from small drones. Anduril’s Pulsar-L is a sensor and jammer package designed to stop small Group 1 and 2 radio-frequency drones.

“The system is currently in use by the Special Operations Command due to the system’s low weight, proven performance in engaging multiple UASs, and simultaneous execution of the full kill-chain while static or on the move,” noted the Marine contract award.

The Congressional Research Service also questioned whether a possible plan to expand the Marine Corps would, in turn, require more ACVs, which cost about $6 million each, depending on the variant.

Last month, a Force Structure Review suggested adding more than 6,500 personnel by 2032, including additional slots in 19 infantry battalions and two Littoral Combat Teams.

If the plan is implemented, “would additional ACVs be required to accommodate growth in Marine infantry units?” CRS asked.

The ACV comes in multiple variants, including the ACV-P troop carrier, ACV-C command vehicle, ACV-30 fire support model armed with a 30mm cannon, and the ACV-R armored recovery vehicle.

Initially, the Marines envisioned buying 1,122 ACVs. But the current plan is for 608 vehicles, comprising 389 ACV-P, 33 ACV-C, 152 ACV-30 and 34 ACV-R, Marine Corps officials told CRS.

BAE was just awarded a $230 million contract modification for 32 ACV-Rs, which will be the final ACV variant. The order is scheduled to be fulfilled by November 2028.

For fiscal 2027, the Navy is requesting $237 million for ACV upgrades.

The ACV has already experienced teething pains. After two ACVs tipped over in 2022 while operating in surf up to 10 feet high, the Marines briefly suspended ACV operations in the open ocean, as long as significant breaker height doesn’t exceed four feet.

One issue is the weight of the ACV, which now stands at around 35 tons. In 2025, a Navy Small Business Innovation Research solicitation called for reducing the weight of all ACV variants, and particularly the heavier ACV-30 and ACV-R. The goal is to slim down at least 2,000 pounds per vehicle.

“Components identified as having potential for weight reduction include engine access covers, drive shafts, ramp door, ramp, hatches, external fuel tanks, external metallic and metallic/composite add-on-armor components, suspension, turret exterior panels, and bow plane,” the 2025 solicitation stated.

Saltwater corrosion of ACV struts has also created problems.

“The high deployment schedule combined with the high training tempo of the United States Marine Corps creates an extremely corrosive environment for the ACV not typically experienced by other vehicles,” claimed a January 2026 Sources Sought notice for more than 5,000 corrosion-resistant struts.

In addition, the weight reduction SBIR specified that any solution “must address corrosion issues expected from use in and around salt water. Weight reduction will improve fuel efficiency and can lower the Center of Gravity and Center of Buoyancy.”

U.S. Central Command told IG investigators that “Iranian strikes damaged and destroyed hundreds of buildings and structures at U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and Jordan during the conflict.”

While the report provided no details on damaged military facilities, it did include specifics on damage to U.S. diplomatic facilities.

The State Department told investigators that “U.S. diplomatic facilities in four countries suffered physical damage from Iranian strikes, with an estimated total cost of about $184 million.”

U.S. diplomatic sites in Iraq suffered more than 600 attacks, while the embassies in Kuwait City and Riyadh were also hit.

Operation Epic Fury had cost the United States $33.4 billion as of June 29, based on Pentagon estimates. The amount includes $22.3 billion in expended munitions, $3.7 billion in equipment losses and $7.4 billion in costs beyond CENTCOM’s normal operating expenses.

However, these estimates do not count the costs of repairing infrastructure.

The Department of Defense “did not include the cost of military construction for damaged infrastructure in its estimate because the DoD has not determined what its future posture will be in the region, how it will construct its bases, and what percentage of the construction costs allies and partners will contribute,” the report states.

Because Congress did not appropriate funds for the war in Iran, the money is being funneled from normal operating budgets, such as amounts set aside for training and maintenance.

“The absence of a dedicated appropriation for OEF means that it can be difficult to calculate the total ‘cost’ of OEF,” noted the report, which is among the first official assessments of Operation Epic Fury since it began on Feb. 28.

Funding is also becoming an issue for U.S. Transportation Command, which flew more than 1,500 missions to support the mission.

“During peak OEF times, airlift surged to 30 to 40 daily missions directly into the CENTCOM [area of responsibility], with an additional 20 to 30 daily aircraft pushing into the USEUCOM AOR for transload operations,” the report said.

This cost nearly $2.4 billion as of June 30.

“While these obligations have been largely reimbursed by the military services to date, USTRANSCOM reported that it anticipates delayed payments moving forward as service funding is depleted without a supplemental appropriation,” the IG said.

The report confirmed that dozens of U.S. manned and unmanned aircraft have been destroyed or damaged, based on data from a Congressional Research Service report released in May and “vetted” by CENTCOM as of Aug. 24.

The tally of destroyed aircraft includes four F-15Es, one A-10, four AH-6 helicopters, one AH-64 and one MH-60, as well as an MQ-4C drone and as many as 30 MQ-9 Reapers.

The report listed 18 dead U.S. military personnel as of Aug. 27. The Pentagon claimed 417 wounded as of June 30, though casualty figures released in late August soared to 774.

For some Chinese naval officers, however, the prospect of facing missile-equipped Marine Stand-In Forces, or SIF, on Pacific islands is concerning.

“The USMC’s continuous refinement of the SIF concept and optimization of deployment and operational employment will erode our land-enabled advantages in sea denial, make it more difficult for us to breach island chain blockades, induce rapid depletion of our combat resources, and complicate our operating environment,” according to a recent U.S. Navy translation of a 2023 Chinese military journal article.

“This escalates the real-world threats facing us and we must maintain strategic resolve and respond proactively and effectively,” wrote Senior Captains Yue Zhiqiang, Wang Li and Li Jinqia in the journal Military Art, which was translated by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College.

Stand-In Forces were the centerpiece of the Marine Corps’ much-debated Force Design 2030 plan, which was first released in 2020. A far cry from the large, mechanized Marine operations of World War II, Korea and Vietnam, Force Design 2030 envisions a light infantry force with small, stealthy teams of Marines operating from Pacific islands.

Equipped with sensors and missiles, these personnel would interdict Chinese naval movements while providing surveillance and targeting data for U.S. naval and air operations.

American critics have denounced the plan as leaving Marine detachments unsupplied, unsupported and vulnerable to an overwhelming force. But Chinese experts see SIF units as “key assets for deterrence and containment along China’s frontiers,” which maintain “a persistent forward presence in China’s near seas.”

In particular, the Chinese report expressed concern that Marine littoral forces will unleash missiles as well as unmanned underwater vehicles.

“During crises and armed conflict, SIFs can deploy large UUVs or have submarines launch small UUVs to loiter near our shipping lanes,” they said. “They can covertly ambush or conduct suicide attacks against our undersea forces and large vessels.”

The article suggests the People’s Liberation Army Navy should target Marine SIF units with intensity in the event of a regional fight.

“To effectively counter the USMC SIF, we should adopt a proactive offensive posture, aggressively expand our operational reach, project forces forward, and apply countermeasures at the source,” they argue.

This, the report states, would mean forward-deploying Chinese forces, including extending “undersea combat capabilities as far forward as feasible.” China should also develop “undersea pre­positioned weapons systems,” the authors argue.

The report adds that China should expand surveillance by radar, satellites, underwater sensors and patrol aircraft, while better integrating military, paramilitary and civilian ships to mitigate “fragmented, redundant, and inefficient coastal surveillance efforts.”

A massive fleet of Chinese commercial vessels could also pose a threat to Marine forces, the paper notes.

“We can conduct maritime deception to overwhelm U.S. SIFs with massive information overload to paralyze and neutralize their capabilities, effectively supplementing our own reconnaissance and surveillance assets,” the article states.

To counter the use of unmanned U.S. platforms, the authors recommend developing cheap Chinese drones, as well anti-drone lasers and microwave weapons.

“We absolutely must avoid engaging small capabilities with large capabilities, or resource-intensive assets against lightweight assets,” the report states.

The authors go on to suggest that the command networks coordinating SIFs should also be targeted.

“We must leverage our late-mover advantage in cyber and electromagnetic domain technologies to develop offensive capabilities which can effectively paralyze U.S. maritime command and control networks,” the report states.

The Military Art article reflects longstanding Chinese concerns that U.S. deployments in the Pacific threaten China’s home waters, Lyle Goldstein, director of the China Initiative at Brown University’s Watson School, told Defense News.

“The article is suffused with major concerns about how U.S. strategy might use drones especially, but also small combat units to try to unhinge China’s military,” said Goldstein. “For example, by causing it to divert resources or by enabling long-range targeting of key Chinese assets, including submarines.”

The article also highlights China’s focus on undersea warfare and its sensitivity toward the safety of its own submarines.

“A major theme of the article is the undersea contest and how the USMC strategy could impact China’s egress of submarines,” said Goldstein, who is also director of the Asia Program at the think-tank Defense Priorities.

“It is also interesting that the article seems to place a very high premium on China’s ability to wield UUVs, along with the related undersea acoustic detection arrays off of Chinese ports and key waterways.”

The Pentagon now wants artificial intelligence that can cut through the confusion.

It’s seeking “AI-based software tools to turn fragmented sensor data into a continuously updated understanding of space and missile threats fast enough to drive operational decisions,” according to the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation, which is due Sept. 24. “Existing tools struggle to distinguish closely spaced objects, track emerging threats, and keep threat models current.”

The project, known as the “Space Threat Intelligence Synthesis Engine,” will leverage AI’s greatest strength: the ability to quickly analyze reams of data. The software will fuse “massive streams of multi-source data, including live video, satellite imagery, radar and sensor feeds, geospatial data, and classified intelligence reports.”

“By automating advanced cross-data correlation, the architecture aims to uncover hidden patterns, complex operational relationships, and predictive threat behaviors far beyond the capabilities of human analysis alone.”

Ultimately, the system should “generate actionable, confidence-scored alerts supporting analyst-in-the-loop, human-on-the-loop, or automated workflows.”

The AI will help human operators — and other machines.

It will provide “intuitive, human-readable visualizations for frontline operators and low-latency, machine-to-machine APIs to drive automated command-and-control (C2) workflows.”

DIU is aiming for an open-source system with a latency delay of no more than five seconds — and preferably no more than two seconds — between the arrival of data and the results being displayed. Throughput should be 20 to 30 megabytes per minute, with bursts of up to five gigabytes.

Contractors should demonstrate that their products show “significant speed and accuracy improvements in event detection, characterization, and attribution compared to existing baseline systems.”

As skies fill with missiles and drones in conflicts like the ones with Ukraine and Iran, AI is increasingly being seen as an indispensable partner to overworked human operators. In particular, with a perpetual shortage of expensive interceptors, such as the Patriot air-defense system, operators must quickly decide when and where to allocate them.

Defense contractors and AI firms are teaming up to incorporate AI into missile defense.

For example, Northrop Grumman announced in July that it was partnering with AI firm Camgian to incorporate artificial intelligence into integrated air and missile defense systems. BAE and Scale AI have also teamed up for AI-enhanced missile defense.

The Department of Defense wants to take that idea one step further and wield AI-generated “personalities” to mimic real people — and fool enemy AI trying to identify patterns in friendly cellphone traffic.

The goal is to mask “digital exhaust,” the metadata automatically emitted by mobile phones, such as location and specific device IDs. Intelligence agencies, law enforcement, militaries and even criminals have become adept at using this digital debris to locate users and analyze their behavior.

In particular, “accessing foreign mobile phone networks exposes individuals and organizations to surveillance and espionage threats,” warned the DoD Small Business Innovation Research solicitation, which opens Sept. 23 and closes Oct. 21.

“Adversaries can leverage this data to track daily routines, identify deviations indicating special events (e.g., VIP visits or mission preparation), and map sensitive facilities based on cell phone concentration or periods of inactivity,” the solicitation explained.

The solicitation doesn’t specifically mention AI-created people chatting on their mobiles. But DoD does envision a “digital exhaust deception system” in which AI “personas” generate cellphone signals that mimic the behavior of real people.

Each device should have a minimum of two personas, and eventually four or more. The device should weigh fewer than 2 pounds and have a battery life of up to 36 hours.

Merely generating fake cellphone signals isn’t enough. The device must “mimic realistic patterns of life to defeat automated network analysis,” DoD said.

At a minimum, this means defeating basic traffic analysis. Ultimately, the Pentagon wants a system that can defeat behavioral tracking by advanced AI.

Phase I of the project involves creating a design concept and algorithms, as well as listing any “proprietary software required to conduct AI-enabled mission planning and operations.” Phase II will generate a prototype, followed by Phase III and delivery of “fully integrated mission management software and hardened decoy box form factors (e.g., Wi-Fi router-sized team devices and puck-sized personal devices).”

The technology could lend itself to civilian applications. A capability to obscure cell phone metadata “directly translates to protecting high-value corporate assets, personnel, and intellectual property from commercial espionage and tracking,” the solicitation states.

Analyzing signal traffic has long been a useful intelligence tool. For example, in World War II, the U.S. Navy used it to derive intelligence on Japanese naval deployment. Today, police have software that uses cell phone data to trace a user’s past movement for months.

On the other hand, traffic analysis can boomerang on its creators. Japan used decoy radio signals in 1941 to convince U.S. analysts that the Japanese fleet was at home, rather than steaming toward Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

The goal is to develop sensors that can “scan individual hard armor plates for cracks and delaminations,” according to a Marine Corps Request For Information, which is due Oct. 2. More specifically, the devices will inspect Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts and United States Marine Corps Lightweight Plates.

The Enhanced Armor Inspection System will use computed tomography, or CT, scanners. CT scanning, commonly used for tasks such as medical imaging and airport bomb detection, creates 3D images that are more detailed than traditional 2D X-ray images.

The Marine Corps intends to set up 10 CT scanners for body armor inspection. This includes six devices in the continental United States, two in Japan and one each in Hawaii and Guam.

The Marine Corps currently uses two techniques to spot defects in body armor, as explained in a 2023 Small Business Innovation Research solicitation that sought new methods of examining cracked ceramic plates and delaminated polyethylene layers. Cracked ceramics are detected by X-rays and deformed polyethylene by tapping the armor and determining whether the sound is like a chime (good) or a thud (bad).

The SBIR did point to CT scanning as an alternative, but noted that “this method is extremely expensive and requires highly trained personnel.”

The new RFI seeks an automated commercial system. It should include an “automated material custom conveyance & sorting system, imaging system, and data processing/handling that is fully equipped with customized Automated Defect Recognition (ADR) software to meet the USMC’s requirements.”

Contractors should specify how many plates per minute their systems can examine. They are also asked to describe how well the scanners can handle “materials with varying densities or compositions, such as the blend of boron carbide and silicon carbide, or the presence of metal crack arrestors.”

In 2011, a Department of Defense Inspector General audit found that the U.S. Army had purchased 5.1 million ballistic inserts that might have been defective. Army tests sometimes failed to use the correct-sized armor plates, the proper velocity for bullets fired at the plates or assess the effects of weathering and altitude.

The Army replied that there was “no case in which the military’s body armor has failed to do its job in protecting troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

There have also been claims of defective military body armor in Britain and Taiwan, as well as for U.S. police departments.

The Navy put out a fast-track solicitation for new on-base housing facilities for unmarried military personnel. The project includes four Bachelor Enlisted Quarters, or BEQs, with 401 rooms each, three with 361 rooms apiece and three more with 261 rooms each.

“The initiative will replace 10 outdated barracks buildings … nearly 656,000 square feet in total … with modern, high-quality facilities engineered to meet revised spatial standards and living configurations for today’s Marines,” according to a Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command news release.

On July 1, NAVFAC published a Special Notice announcing new barracks for Camp Pendleton, as well as Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California; Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina; Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina; and Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; as well as childcare centers at several Navy bases.

NAVFAC released a solicitation for the actual construction Saturday, with a deadline of Oct. 1. The Navy wants barracks that are built using “advanced manufacturing and IC [industrialized construction] methodologies (such as volumetric modular, hybrid, and/or Kit of Parts) to deliver high-performing, durable barracks,” the solicitation said.

Buildings will use modular construction to reduce maintenance costs.

“Barracks are especially well-suited for industrialized construction because their repeated room layouts and common building systems support faster, more standardized delivery at-scale,” the NAVFAC release noted.

The project will use the Progressive Design Build concept in which the government, contractors and off-site manufacturers collaborate early in the design phase. The goal is to cut construction time by at least 30%, and construction and design costs by at least 20%.

“Selected vendors will be invited to submit full proposals covering design, manufacturing, logistics, and construction pricing and schedules for replacement barracks at Camp Pendleton,” the solicitation said.

The contract will be an Other Transaction Authority arrangement, which allows agencies to speed up projects by bypassing many regulations and processes governing federal acquisitions.

Originally a 1950s mechanism to energize research and technology projects during the Cold War, OTAs were recently extended to include military construction and repair efforts.

“Our Marines cannot wait for traditional acquisition and construction timelines,” NAVFAC Commander Rear Adm. Jeffrey Kilian said in a statement. “Using this new OTA authority, NAVFAC can move faster, bring in the best of industry, and deliver barracks that match the standards our Marines deserve.”

The Camp Pendleton construction is part of Barracks 2030, a nearly $11 billion initiative to replace aging and decrepit Marine living quarters by 2037. Marine Corps leaders describe the program as a top priority.

In 2021, a DoD Inspector General audit found that snoopers were able to access the protected health information, or PHI, of “well-known DOD personnel.” Meanwhile, the Department of Veterans Affairs found that VA staff — often out of simple curiosity — had improperly accessed records of then-vice presidential candidates J.D. Vance and Tim Walz.

The Defense Health Agency has since tightened access to health records of well-known personnel, according to a follow-up DOD IG audit published Monday. But what DHA isn’t doing is investigating access by people who are not on a designated list of approved users.

The DHA “rarely investigated users who accessed the EHRs [electronic health records] of well‑known individuals to determine whether the access was improper,” said the IG report, which was heavily redacted.

DHA maintains a whitelist of authorized medical providers who can access health records, as well as a watchlist of users who are suspected of unauthorized access. Individuals on the watchlist are supposed to be referred to DHA’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Office, or to “the military medical treatment facility chain of command, for breach reporting, investigation, mitigation, containment, and sanctions if applicable,” the report noted.

DHA is also supposed to review weekly logs to determine whether access was justified.

Yet, DHA neither investigated users who were not on the approved list, nor those on the watchlist. Auditors examined the cases of 25 DoD personnel who were either senior officials or whose names had appeared in the media after a highly publicized event.

“Of the 2,600 users who accessed the PHI of those 25 well‑known individuals, 1,482 of the users were on the DHA’s Whitelist, and 15 were on the DHA’s Watchlist,” IG investigators found. “Of the 1,103 users (42 percent) who were not on the DHA’s Whitelist or Watchlist, the DHA did not investigate any of the users.”

In the case of one senior DOD official, 334 users accessed that person’s health records. Of that number, 94 were neither on the whitelist nor watchlist. There were no follow-up investigations.

One DHA policy — redacted in the report — isn’t meeting DoD guidelines, and it may also violate the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA, the audit said. In addition, it “may not support the Executive Order and National Counterintelligence Strategy that warned that access to sensitive information of well‑known individuals could threaten national security.”

“Without proper monitoring and inquiry, users who improperly access these EHRs would not be held accountable as required by DHA guidance.”

The IG recommended that DHA contact any user not on the approved whitelist who accessed the health records of well-known individuals. The agency should also maintain a complete audit trail of all correspondence between DHA and the user.

If the Defense Health Agency lacks the resources or authorities to complete these inquiries, it should coordinate with the appropriate DoD or other federal components for assistance, the report suggested.